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JUDICIAL NOTICE*
CHARLES T. McCORMICKt
1.

THE NEED FOR AND THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE 1

The traditional Anglo-American system of proof demands rigorous
guaranties of accuracy, with its requirement of witnesses having first-hand
knowledge, its mistrust of hearsay, however reliable, except for narrow exceptions, and its insistence upon original documents and their authentication
by witnesses. These requirements have their roots in the contentious or
adversary system, where the party and not the judge is responsible for
gathering and presenting facts, and in the method of jury trial. But this strict
though scientific insistence upon proving everything at first hand is, like
jury-trial itself, enormously costly in time, energy and money.
The principal effect of the use of the doctrine of judicial notice is to
excuse the party having the burden of establishing a fact from the necessity
of producing formal proof of the fact 2 by sworn witnesses and authenticated
documents or objective evidence. Besides this important effect of dispensing at
least provisionally with formal proof, which all courts and writers concede to
be the primary effect of judicial notice, there are other possible consequences,
sometimes disputed, which will be discussed later.3
The requirement of formal proof by witnesses and documents under the
restrictions of the preferential and exclusionary rules has been assumed
to be justified generally for the ascertainment of facts at judicial trials. But
in some situations this cumbrous process of formal proof is plainly not needed
at all. In other situations compliance with the process might conceivably
give some enhanced accuracy, but the added assurance would be marginal and
clearly not worth what it would cost.
What are these situations? First, where the fact in question is known
at once with certainty by all the reasonably intelligent people in the community
*This article will appear as a chapter in a brief treatise on Evidence, to be published by the West Publishing Company.
,Professor of Law, The University of Texas; editor, CASES oN EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1948) and other casebooks; author, DAMAGES (1935) and other books and articles.

1. General references: THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE c.7 (1898) ;
§§ 2565-83 (3d ed. 1940) ; MAGUIRE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

LAW 166-75 (1947); Davis, Official Notice, 62 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1949); Keeffe,
Landis and Shadd, Sense and Nonsense about Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REV. 664
(1950) ; Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 H~Av. L. REV. 269 (1944); Strahorn, The
Process of Judicial Notice, 14 VA. L. REV. 544 (1928); York, Unjudicial Notes on
Judicial Notice, 13 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 374 (1941); DEC. DIG., Evidcnce ## 1-52,
Crim. Law # 304; 31 C.J.S., Evidence §§ 6-102 (1942) ; 20 Am. JUR., Evidence §§ 16-130
(1939). For good general statements of the doctrine, see Porter v. Sunshine Packing
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 566, 575 (W.D. Pa. 1948); Williams v. Comm., 190 Va. 280, 56
S.E.2d 537, 542, syl. 2 (1949).

2. Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 181 Pac. 223, 226 (1919).
3. See pp. 318 et seq. infra.
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without the need of resorting to any evidential data at all. Second, where
reasonably intelligent people might not have in mind the information in question, but where they would agree that the facts are verifiable with certainty
by looking at authoritative books of reference. This principle of verifiability
with certainty should prove to be the growth-principle in the evolution of
judicial notice. Third, where the ascertainment of the matter falls within the
special responsibility of the judge as a judge, such as the rules of law
applicable to a case before him, and matters pertaining to the personnel,
records, organization and jurisdictional boundaries of the court-system to
which his court belongs. Fourth, where questions arise as to other governmental facts, which the judge as an officer of government is considered to
have special facilities and responsibility for learning and verifying. Fifth,
where a judge is faced with the task of creating law, by deciding upon the
constitutional validity of a statute, or its interpretation, or the extension or
restriction of a decisional rule, upon grounds of policy, and such policy is
thought to hinge upon social, economic, political or scientific facts. Though
the conclusions from these facts, or the facts themselves,. may be debatable,
the situation is close to class three, the law-finding process, so that jury-trial
is inappropriate, and the restrictions of formal proof almost equally so.
These situations are, of course, not mutually exclusive. For instance, the
characteristic of the second situation, certain verifiability, obtains also in
respect to situations three and four.
Certain other circumstances, less specifically definable in effect, may
also be suggested as apparently influencing the courts' willingness to apply
the doctrine of judicial notice. A court is more willing to notice a general
than a specific fact, as for example, the approximate time of the normal period
of human gestation, 4 but not the precise maximum and minimum limits.5
Again, it is obvious in reading the cases that the courts make a wider use of
judicial notice in formulating arguments in supporting conclusions of law
than in deciding particular facts in issue. Moreover, it seems that the easy,
accessibility of reliable sources of information, and the experience and skill
that the judge possesses in the particular field or science will influence him
in his decision whether to take judicial notice. Another factor which seemingly
should, and probably does have an influence, is the feeling that judicial notice
may work beneficially in certain cases by withdrawing from jury consideration fact-questions of science and technology which a jury, because of its
4. Equitable Trust Co. v. McComb, 19 Del. Ch. 387, 168 Atl. 203, syl. 6 (1933).
5. Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 299 Mass. 7, 11 N.E.2d 482, syl. 6 (1937). But if may so
far take cognizance of the general limits as to find a particular birth to be probably
within or beyond them. See Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 Pac. 552, syl. 4, 7
A.L.R. 313 (1919) ; cf. Cronin v. Cronin, 234 Ky. 207, 27 S.W.2d 950, syl. 2 (1930);
Harward v. Harward, 173 Md. 339, 196 Atl. 318, syl. 1, 2 (1938).
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limitations and prejudices, is ill-adapted to handle. Finally, the decisions of
the upper courts manifest a willingness to extend the bounds of judicial
notice for the purpose of sustaining a just judgment in the lower court,7 and
a corresponding tendency to restrict its application where the result would
be to overturn a satisfactory disposition.
Judges have been prone to emphasize the need for caution in applying
the doctrine of judicial notice. s The great writers on Evidence, on the other
hand, having perhaps a wider view of the needs of judicial administration,
advocate a more extensive use of the doctrine. Thus Thayer suggests: "Courts
may. judicially notice much that they cannot be required to notice. That is
well worth emphasizing, for it points to a great possible usefulness in this
doctrine, in helping to shorten and simplify trials. . . . [T]he failure to
exercise it tends daily to smother trials with technicality, and monstrously
lengthens them out."9 And Wigmore says, "The principle is an instrument
of usefulness hitherto unimagined by judges."' 0
2. MATTERS OF CoMMON KNOWLEDGE
The oldest and plainest ground for judicial notice is that the fact is so
commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require
proof, and so certainly known as to make it indisputable among reasonable
men. 1 Though this basis for notice is sometimes loosely described as universal
knowledge, manifestly this could not be taken literally' 2 and the modern
opinions, more reasonably, speak in terms of the knowledge of "most men,"'u
or of "what well-informed persons generally know,"' 4 or "the knowledge
that every intelligent person has.'u S These phrases progressively widen the
6. See Jordan v. Mace, 69 A.2d 670 (Me. 1949), where the court (without alluding
to judicial notice) set aside a verdict establishing paternity in a bastardy case on the

ground of the scientific reliability of blood-tests showing nonpaternity. See also Note,
163 A.L.R. 949 (1946), collecting conflicting decisions on the courts' power to take
judicial knowledge of the scientific validity or conclusiveness of such tests.
7. See Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 190 (1931).
8. See, e.g., Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 345, 181 Pac. 223, 226 (1919); State v.
Clousing, 205 Minn. 296, 285 N.W. 711, 123 A.L.R. 465, 470 (1939).
9. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 309 (1898).
10. 9 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE 585 (3d ed. 1940).
11. Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 181 Pac. 223, 227, syl. 11 (1919) ; Gulf C. & S.F.
Ry. Co. v. State, 72 Tex. 404, 10 S.W. 81, 82 (1888); Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57
HARv. L. REv. 269, 272-73 (1944).
12. In Topeka v. Stevenson, 79 Kan. 394, 99 Pac. 588 (1909), the court in taking
judicial notice of the meaning of the initials R.M.L.D. (retail malt liquor dealer) said,
"It is not necessary for courts to wait, before taking judicial notice of a thing, until
everybody knows and understands it. The meaning of a term has become a part of
our common knowledge when it is generally understood by persons familiar with the
subject."
13. Porter v. Waring, 69 N.Y. 250, 253 (1877).
14. Brandon v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 506, 163 P.2d 384, 387, syl. 6

(1945).
15. Strain v. Isaacs, 135 Ohio St. 495, 18 N.E.2d 816, 825 (1938).
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circle of facts within "common knowledge." Moreover, though usually facts
of "common knowledge" will be generally known throughout the country,
it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the local
community where the trial court sits.'0 By analogy may the common knowledge concept be extended to knowledge common to those in a particular
trade? There are some affirmative intimations,' 7 but it seems the law has
not yet gone so far,18 and that most of the need for judicial knowledge of
facts generally known in a trade or profession can be satisfied by resort to
the formula developed in the next section of facts ascertainable with certainty.
A famous colloquy in the Year Books shows that a clear difference has
long been taken between what judges may notice judicially and the facts
that the particular judge happens personally to know.' 9 It is not a distinction
easy for a judge to follow in application, but the doctrine is accepted that
actual private knowledge by the judge is no sufficient ground for taking
judicial notice of a fact as a basis for a finding or a final judgment, 20 though
it may still be a ground, it is believed, for exercising certain discretionary
powers, such as awarding probation in a criminal case, or granting a motion

for new trial to avoid an injustice.
Jury-knowledge.-The jury has the power, analogous to the power of the
judge, to consider as if proven, facts within the common knowledge of the
community. Accordingly, the court may instruct them to take in account
16. Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 181 Pac. 223, syl. 13 (1919) (that a certain portion
of Mission Street is in a business district is well known to citizens of San Francisco) ;
Randall v. Commonwealth, .183 Va. 182, 31 S.E.2d 571, syl. 4 (1944) (in robbery prosecution trial judge, in taking judicial notice that "half-way house," the place of the robbery,
was located in county where venue laid, will be assumed to have done so on basis of
community knowledge). But "night club gossip and stories appearing in newspapers"
are not equivalent to community knowledge. Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal., App.2d 669, 169
P.2d 453, syl. 11-14 (1946) (Los Angeles trial court in filiation case could not take
judicial notice of extent of wealth of Charles Chaplin). There are intimations that local
customs may not be noticed. See, e.g., First National Bank v. Commercial Bank &
Trust Co., 137 Wash. 335, 242 Pac. 356, syl. 6, 7 (1926). But, under the present principle,
if generally and certainly known in the community, they should be.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, syl. 4 (2d Cir. 1946); United
Carbon Co. v. Monroe, 92 F. Supp. 460, 465, syl. 6 (W.D. La. 1950); Ritholz v.
Johnson, 244 Wis. 494, 12 N.W.2d 738, 741, syl. 3, 4 (1944).
18. Kennedy v. General Geophysical Co., 213 S.WN.2d 707, syl. 1 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948). And the courts say that they will not notice, as such, customs in a particular
trade [Eluzis' Case, 292 Mass. 351, 198 N.E. 262, syl. 2 (1935); Usher v. Eckhardt,
176 Minn. 210, 222 N.W. 924, syl. 1 (1929)], though there is no, reason why, in a
given case, such custom might not be a matter commonly known or certainly ascertainable.
19. Anon., Y.B. 7 Hen. IV, f.41, pl. 5 (1406), from which the following is an
excerpt: "Tirwhit: Sir, let us put the case that a man kills another in your presence
and sight, and another who is not guilty is indicted before you and is found guilty of
the same death, you ought to respite the judgment against him, for you know the
contrary, and report the matter to the King to pardon him. No more ought you to
give judgment in this case. . . . Gascoigne, C.J. One time the King himself asked me
about this very case which you have put, and asked me what was the law, and I told
him just as you say, and he was well pleased that the law was so."
20. Gibson v. Von Glahn Hotel Co., 185 N.Y. Supp. 154, syl. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1920):
Darnell v. Barker, 179 Va. 86, 18 S.E.2d 271, syl. 3-5 (1942) ; Note, 113 A.L.R. 258

(1938),
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their knowledge and experience, common to the community generally, in
weighing the evidence ;21 counsel may, without evidence, argue the truth of
such facts ;22 and the courts in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the verdict, will give weight to this factor. 23 The other grounds,
however, for judicial notice, discussed in succeeding sections, are not the
basis for jury-knowledge but are available only for administration by the judge.
3.

FACTS CAPABLE OF CERTAIN VERIFICATION

The earlier and still the most familiar basis for judicial notice is "common knowledge." Not only has this conception widened with the progress
of the law, but a second and distinct principle has now come to be recognized.
Matters of common knowledge would nearly always be matters that the
judge would know off-hand without occasion for any investigation. But
when asked to notice a fact not generally known, but which obviously could
easily be ascertained by consulting materials in common use, such as the
day of the week on which January 1 fell ten years ago, the judges resorted
to the fiction that in consulting the calendar and taking judicial notice they
24
were merely "refreshing memory" as to a matter of common knowledge.
More realistically, we have here an important extension of judicial notice to
2
the new field of facts "capable of accurate and ready demonstration, r
"capable of such instant and unquestionable demonstration, if desired, that
no party would think of imposing a falsity on the tribunal in the face of an
intelligent adversary," 26 or "capable of immediate and accurate demonstration
by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy," 27 as variously
21. Marshall v. State, 54 Fla. 66, 44 So. 742, syl. 5 (1900) ; Notes, 16 TEXAs L. REv.
403 (1938), 144 A.L.R. 932 (1943). In principle, of course, the knowledge of a juror

about the facts of the particular case should not be considered. He should testify. Perhaps, in strictness, expertness of particular jurors about values, skills or occupational
knowledge should not be considered, not being common to the jurors and shared by the
community. Some courts have held that instructions on jury-knowledge which fail to
make this clear are ground for reversal. Downing v. Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
158 Iowa 1, 138 N.W. 917, syl. 2 (1912). But there is much force to the contrary view
that this restriction sacrifices one of the chief values of jury trial, and is a restriction
which jurors cannot and will not obey. Solberg v. Robbins Lumber Co., 147 Wis. 259,
133 N.W. 28, syl. 3 (1911) (instruction permitting jurors to pool their individual
knowledge, approved).
22. State v. Marsh, 70 Vt. 288, 40 Atl. 837, syl. 12 (1898); Kuehl v. Hamilton,
136 Ore. 240, 297 Pac. 1043, syl. 6, 7 (1931).
23. Leary v. Fitchburg Ry., 173 Mass. 373, 53 N.E. 817 (1899) (common experience
as to way of alighting from cars) ; Carlton v. Sley System Garages, 143 Pa. Super. 127,
17 A.2d 748, 749 (1941) (jurors' community knowledge about streets and traffic in
Philadelphia) ; Shikany v. Salt Creek Transp. Co., 48 Wyo. 190, 45 P.2d 645, syl. 13
(1935) (common knowledge about value of rugs).
24. See, e.g., Friend v. Burnham & Morrill Co., 55 F.2d 150, 151 (1st Cir. 1932)
(court "warranted . . . in taking judicial notice of any common or general knowledge
relating to canning cooked foods, and to refresh his recollection by reference to standard
publications").
25. Note, 47 COL. L. Ray. 151 (1947).
26. 9 WIGMOaE, EVIDENcE 548 (3d ed. 1940).

27.

MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,

Rule 802(c) (1942).
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stated. 28 In this realm fall most of the facts, theories, and conclusions which
have come to be established and accepted by the specialists in the areas of
33
32
31
30
natural science, 29 natural phenomena, chronology, technology, history,

geography,3 4 statistical facts3 5 and other fields of professional and scientific
knowledge.
The judge is free to consult on his own motion any sources that he
considers reliable, 3G but under our tradition of party-presentation, the extent
28. See also In re Malcom, 129 F.2d 529, 533 (C.C.P.A.

1942); Nichols v.

Nichols, 126 Conn. 614, 13 A.2d 591, 595 (1940) ; State v. Schriber, 185 Ore. 615, 205
P.2d 149, syl. 6 (1949).

29. See, e.g., Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 123 F.2d 890, syl. 3
(3d Cir. 1941) (that heated oxygen will combine with lead to form lead oxide) ; Russo
v. Swift & Co., 136 Neb. 406, 286 N.W. 291, syl. 2 (1939) (nature and origin of disease
of echinococcosis) ; State v. Schriber, 185 Ore. 615, 205 P.2d 149, syl. 8 (1949) (that
Bang's disease is an infectious and contagious disease of cattle). See Note, Judiciat
Notice of Medical Facts, 36 Micr. L. REv. 610 (1938). See also Buhrkuhl v. F. T.
O'Dell Const. Co., 232 Mo. App. 967, 95 S.W.2d 843, syl. 4-8 (1936), where the court
takes judicial notice that a barn taller than other buildings on an isolated farm was a
place of special danger from lightning.
Disagreements as to whether particular scientific questions are within the field
of judicial knowledge are, naturally, not uncommon. See, e.g., Universal Granite
Quarries Co. v. Industrial Commission, 224 Wis. 680, 272 N.W. 863, syl. 1 (1937), and
Smith v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 340 Mo. 389, 100 S.W.2d 909, syl. 16
(1936) (that some dust causes lung trouble); In re Swahn's Will, 158 Misc. 17, 285
N.Y. Supp. 234 (Surr. Ct. 1936), and Commonwealth v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 161,
186 Adt. 298, syl. 7 (1936) (that blood-grouping tests are relevant on question of
paternity) ; Cowan v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co., 52 Ga. App. 667, 184 S.E. 635
(1936), and Win. A. Smith Const. Co. v. Brumley, 88 F.2d 803, syl. 3 (10th Cir. 1937)
(whether rays of locomotive headlight crossing rays of automobile light would cut off
latter light). The courts not infrequently will use the doctrine of judicial notice as a
basis for determining that expert opinion testimony contrary to accepted knowledge is
not to be believed. See, e.g., Parton v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 231 Mo. App. 585, 107
S.W.2d 176 syl. 7 (1937) (testimony that it is not dangerous to pour kerosene on a fire).
Manifestly, a court may judicially notice general principles and limits where it cannot
be certain of the particular application. See Muse v. Page, 125 Conn. 219, 4 A.2d 329,
syl. 6-8 (1939) (distance within which a truck can be stopped).
30. McAffee v. United States, 111 F.2d 199, syl. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (maximum
and minimum temperatures in District of Columbia on certain date) ; State v. Perkins,
342 Mo. 560, 116 S.W.2d 80, syl. 5 (1938) (time of sunrise on particular morning).
31. State v. Van Ness, 109 Vt. 392, 199 AtI. 754, syl. 10, 117 A.L.R. 415 (1938) (days
of week on which certain dates fell).
32. Werk v. Parker, 249 U.S. 130, 132, syl. 1, 39 Sup. Ct. 197, 63 L. Ed. 514
(1919) (court by reference to encyclopedia and other authorities could take notice that
long before present patent was issued the use of horse-hair mats in presses for the
extraction of oil was well known in the art).
33. Unity Oil Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 141 Me. 148, 40 A.2d 4, 156 A.L.R. 297
(1944) (dates of declaration of World War II and of beginning of rationing) ; Miller v.
Fowler, 200 Miss. 776. 28 So.2d 837, syl. 3-7 (1947) (that acts of warfare betveen
Japan and the United States had not entirely ceased on Aug. 14, 1945).
34. See, e.g., Swarzwald v. Cooley, 39 Cal. App.2d 306, 103 P.2d 580, syl. 6 (1940)
(meaning of phrase, "ordinary high tide," in the vicinity of Laguna Beach).
35. Groves v. Board of Comm'rs, 209 Ind. 371, 199 N.E. 137, syl. 2 (1936) (population of cities and towns of state shown by federal census) ; Cox v. Polson Logging Co.,
18 Wash. 2d 49, 138 P.2d 169, syl. 6 (1943) (trial judge may inform jury of life expectancy from mortality tables without proof) ; DEc. DIG., Evidence # 12.
36. Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 42, 23 L. Ed. 200 (1875) ("any means . . . which
he may deem safe and proper"); Dwinell-Wright Co. v. National Fruit Product Co..
140 F.2d 618, 624. syl. 12 (1st Cir. 1944) (essays, magazine articles and brochures):
People v. Mayes, 113 Cal. 618, 45 Pac. 860, 862, syl. 1 (1896) ("any source of informa-
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of the judge's willingness to take the initiative in looking up the authoritative
sources will usually be limited,37 and it is the task of counsel to find and to
present in argument and briefs such references, excerpts and explanations as
will convince the judge that the fact is certain and demonstrable.!,, If on
investigation he finds that the fact, theory or conclusion which he is asked
to notice is one which the authorities in the field reveal as debatable, he will
leave the question for resolution by expert testimony.
An able Minnesota judge has said that judicial notice of scientific facts
can be taken only when such facts are "generally recognized" and not when
such facts "are known, if at all, only by a specially informed class of persons." 39 It is suggested, however, that this limitation is a throw-back to the
earlier view that common knowledge was a universal requirement, and is
inconsistent with the later recognition that ready and indisputable verifiability
is a distinct and sufficient basis for judicial notice. Such a restriction would
stand as a bar to judicial notice in most of the areas of science, technology,
and statistics where it can be most usefully employed. It is true that a judge
when asked to notice scientific facts will on examination of the data often
conclude that the scientists do not agree, or do agree that the supposed fact
is doubtful or debatable, or he may conclude that he, the judge, is unable
from his reading of the data to be sure that the fact is scientifically accepted.
All these would be clear grounds for refusing notice. But to say that he
can never notice a scientific fact if not commonly known assumes that
judges having in view their general level of intelligence and training are
not able, in a useful proportion of cases, to examine technical scientific materials and determine safely whether a given fact, theory or conclusion is
accepted. Surely this is too modest an estimate of the capacity of our judges.
40
Certainly the supposed limitation is not the measure of what they.actually do.
In the progress of science facts and theories are constantly changing
from the unknown or debatable to the realm of the accepted and established.
tion which he may deem authentic either by inquiry of others, or by the examination
of books, or by receiving the testimony of witnesses") ; 9 WIGAMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2568a
(3d ed. 1940) ; 31 C.J.S., Evidence § 12 (1942). Compare, however, the holding that
the trial court should not rely on medical treatises on an issue on which evidence has
been received, in Anderson v. Jersey Creamery Co., 278 Mich. 396, 270 N.W. 725, syl.
1 (1936), critically noted, 36 MicHr. L. REV. 610, 615 (1938). A favorite source, as
might be expected, is the encyclopedia. See, e.g., Chiulla de Luca v. Board, 94 Conn. 7,
107 Atl. 611, 612 (1919) (propensities of lightning) ; Timson v. Manufacturers' Gas &
Coal Co., 220 Mo. 580, 119 S.W. 565, 568 (1909) (that all coal mines generate gas,
notice refused) ; Note, Notice of Scientific Facts from Encyclopcdias and Dictionaries,
9 KAN.. CITY L. REv. 38 (1940).
37. Cf. Russell v. Liberman, 71 R.I. 448, 46 A.2d 858, 860 (1946).
38. Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 475, 57 Sup. Ct. 17, syl. 5, 81 L. Ed. 386 (1937)
(question of validity of an expropriation under Mexican law; held, party having burden
to prove invalidity fails, when the court is left without knowledge of invalidating rule,
after exploring, in its function of judicial notice, every channel of information).
39. Lickfett v. Jorgenson, 179 Minn. 321, 229 N.W. 138, 139, syl. 3 (1930).
40. See the holdings described in notes 29-35, supra, and see Note, 36 Micn. L. Rv.
610, 611 (1938).
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Thus, the theories underlying the identification of the handwriting of a
document by expert analysis, or of a person by his fingerprints, or of firearms by "ballistics-tests" were all once debatable but are now accepted.
The capacity of "lie-detector" tests, by measurements of blood-pressure
interpreted by technicians, to reveal conscious lying is now considered
debatable41 but tomorrow may be viewed by the courts as scientifically established. 42 And even now, we probably are in transition from judicial scepticism
to judicial acceptance of the certainty of conclusions to be drawn from
biological tests showing nonpaternity.43 On the other hand innumerable
scientific "certainties" of the past such as the fact of the flatness of the earth,
or the efficacy of blood-letting as a remedy for disease, which could once have
been judicially noticed under this principle, would today have to be noticed
inreverse.
In the increasingly important practice of judicial notice of scientific
and technological facts, some of the possibilities of error are, fi'st, that the
courts may fail to employ the doctrine of judicial notice in this field to the
full measure of its usefulness, 44 second, that they may mistakenly accept as
authoritative scientific theories that are outmoded or are not yet received by
the specialists as completely verified, and third, that in taking judicial notice
of accepted scientific facts, the courts, in particular cases may misconceive the
conclusions or applications which are supposed to flow from them. Of these,
it seems that the first has thus far been the most frequent shortcoming.
4.

THE JUDGE'S TASK AS LAW-FINDER-JUDICIAL NOTICE OF LAW

One of the principal functions of the judge, for which he is specially
qualified by professional equipment, is to find and interpret the law applicable
to the issues in a trial, and in a jury case, to announce his findings of law
to the jury for their guidance. The heavy-footed common law system of
proof by witnesses and authenticated documents is too slow and cumbrous
for the judge's task of finding what the applicable law is. Usually this law
is familiar lore and if not he relies on the respective counsel to bring before
41. See People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31, syl. 2, 119 A.L.R. 1198 (1938)
(court could not take judicial notice that the lie-detector is or is not effective for the
discovery of truth). To like effect is State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43, syl.

12, 13 (1945).
42. See Smallwood, Lie-detectors: Discussions and Proposals,29 CORNELL L.Q. 535
(1944). And see Streeter and Belli, The "Fourth Degree": The Lie Detector, infra,
p. 549.
43. Compare Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App.2d 652, 169 P.2d 442, syl. 22-28 (1946)
(jury may rely on mother's testimony and reject result of test), with Jordan v. Mace,

69 A.2d 670, syl. 1-3 (Me. 1949) (verdict contrary to result of tests, authorized by
statute, cannot stand).
44. The holding in Loth v. Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 35 N.W.2d 542, syl. 16, 6 A.L.R.2d
176 (1949), declining to notice the value of stocks presumably quoted on the market,
seems to be an instance.
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him the statutes, reports and source-books, and these every-day companions
of judge and counsel are read from informally in discussion or cited and
quoted in trial and appellate briefs. Occasionally the judge will go beyond
the cited authorities to make his own investigation. In the ordinary process
of finding the applicable law, the normal method, then, is by informal
investigation of any sources satisfactory to the judge, that is, by judicial
notice. Where this norm was departed from, it was in cases where the
source-material was not easily accessible to the judge, as in case of "foreign"
law, or "private" laws or city ordinances. As these materials become more
accessible, the tendency is toward permitting the judges to do, what perhaps
they should have done from the beginning, that is, to rely on the diligence
of counsel to provide the necessary materials, and accordingly to take judicial
notice of all law. This seems to be the goal toward which the practice is
marching.
Domeshtic Law.-As to domestic law generally, the judge is not merely
permitted to take judicial notice but required to do so, 4ri at least if so requested, although in a particular case a party may be precluded on appeal
from complaining of the judge's failure to notice a statute where his counsel
has failed to call it to the judge's attention.4 6 This general rule that judicial
notice will be taken of domestic law means that state trial courts will notice
federal law, 47 which is controlling in every state, and has been held to mean
that in a federal trial court the laws of all the states, not merely of the state
where it is sitting, are domestic and will be noticed. 48 Similarly all state-wide,
or nation-wide, executive orders and proclamations, 49 which are legally effec45. Strain v. Isaacs, 135 Ohio St. 495, 18 N.E.2d 816, 825 (Ohio App. 1938)
(dictum) ; Randall v. Comm., 183 Va. 182, 31 S.E.2d 571, 572, syl. 1 (1944) (dictun)
20 AM. JuR., Evidence § 23 (1939) ; MODEL CODE OF EvilnMcE, Rule 801 (1942).
46. Great American Ins. Co. v. Glenwood Irr. Co., 265 Fed. 594, syl. 3-5 (10th Cir.
1920). See, however, an illuminating Note, Overlooking Statutes, 30 YALE L.J. 855
(1921), which surveys the cases and concludes that, generally, errors arising from
ignorance of a statute should be corrected on appeal.
47. State v. Superior Court, 205 Ind. 355, 186 N.E. 310, syl. 12 (1933) (constitution
and statutes); Mangum v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 188 N.C. 689, 125 S.E. 549,
syl. 1 (1924) (Federal Employers' Liability Act); DEc. DiG., Evidence # 34.
48. Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223, 5 Sup. Ct. 857, 29 L. Ed. 94 (1885) (on
appeal from federal court in New York, proper for trial and appellate courts to notice
Georgia law) ; Lane v. Sargent, 217 F. 237, syl. 1 (1st Cir. 1914). Since judicial notice
is regarded as a matter of procedure rather than substantive law, it seems that the
controlling force of state substantive law, under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938), is inapplicable. Win. J. Lemp Brewing Co. v.
Ems Brewing Co., 164 F.2d 290, syl. 4 (7th Cir. 1947) (semble). But see Keeffe et al.,
JudicialNotice, 2 STAN. L. REv. 664, 686 (1950). Cf. Eliscu v. Fiber, 157 F.2d 136, syl. 1
(3d Cir. 1946), which purports to rely on the New Jersey Uniform Act as a ground for
noticing New York law. On appeal, however, from a state court, the Federal Supreme
Court will not notice the law of another state unless the state court below could have
done so. Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1, 6, 6 Sup. Ct. 242, 29 L. Ed. 535 (1885).
49. U.S. cx rel. Crow v. Mitchell, 89 F.2d 805, syl. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (presidential orders relating to civil service) ; Hamilton v. James, 231 Ala. 668, 166 So. 425,
syl. 4 (1936) (president's and governors' proclamations declaring moratorium) ; Heyward
v. Long, 178 S.C. 351, 183 S.E. 145, syl. 8, 114 A.L.R. 1130 (1936) (governor's
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tive, and all state or national administrative regulations,5 ° having the force
of law, will also be noticed. When such documents are included in the
Federal Register it is provided that their contents shall be judicially noticed. 51
2
Under this principle the laws of antecedent governments will be noticed .
Exceptions to the principle, however, are recognized for private laws53 and
municipal ordinances. 54 In terms of practical expediency under modern conditions these last mentioned limitations seem indefensible. 55
The Law of Sister States.-It is easy to see how difference of language
and inaccessibility of source-books should have led the English courts to
develop the common law rule that the laws of foreign nations would not be
noticed but must be pleaded and proved as facts. 55 The assumption in the
earlier cases in this country 57 that the courts of one state must treat the
proclamation declaring highway department in state of insurrection) ; Parker v. Anderson, 112 Vt. 371, 25 A.2d 41, syl. 7 (1942) (president's order requiring Navy to use
force to protect lives and property endangered by hostile power) ; DEc. DIG., Evidence

# 46.
50. Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 66 Sup. Ct. 274, 90 L. Ed. 274 (1946) (regulations of Federal Public Housing Authority) ; United States v. Bradford, 160 F.2d 729,
syl. 4 (2d Cir. 1947) (regulations of federal administrative agencies) ; Milwaukee
Mechanics' Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 139 F.2d 405, syl. 4 (5th Cir. 1943) (regulations of
state fire insurance board) ; Powell v. Anderson, 147 Neb. 872, 25 N.W.2d 401, syl. 4
(1946) (federal regulations); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2572, n.6 (3d ed. 1940); DEc.
DIG., Evidence # 47. For a comprehensive discussion, see Note, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1137
(1946).
51. 49 STAT. 502, 44 U.S.C.A. § 307 (Supp. 1951).
52. Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church, 210 U.S. 296, 309, 28 Sup. Ct. 737, 52 L. Ed.
1068 (1908) (Spanish laws in Puerto Rico) ; Martinez v. Gutierrez, 66 S.W.2d 678, syl. 8
(Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
53. Courts do not notice private acts. Bolick v. City of Charlotte, 191 N.C. 677, 132
S.E. 660, syl. 1 (1926); Chambers v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 32 Ariz. 102, 255
Pac. 1092, syl. 1 (1927) (private acts of Congress). The same has been held as to
local laws. Caldwell v. Crosser, 20 S.W.2d 822, syl. 2 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). And
special acts. Brodsky v. Fine, 263 Mass. 51, 160 N.E. 335, syl. 3 (1928). But all such
acts are readily accessible nowadays, and the rule refusing notice is archaic. Half the
states have abrogated it by statute. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2572, n.14 (3d ed. 1940).
54. Gardner v. Capital Transit Co., 152 F.2d 288, syl. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Page v.
Weiland, 137 Ohio St. 198, 38 N.E.2d 583, syl. 2 (1940); DEc. DIG., Evidence # 32.
This needlessly burdensome practice has been reformed by statute in a few states only.
9 WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 2572, n.15 (3d ed. 1940). In New Hampshire, by decision the
enlightened result has been reached that the court may in its discretion notice ordinances.
Walsh v. Public Service Co., 92 N.H. 331, 30 A.2d 494, syl. 3, 4 (1943). However, a
municipal court will notice the ordinances of the city, and by what seems the better
view, on appeal the reviewing court will do the same. Orose v. Hodge Drive-It-Yourself
Co., 132 Ohio St. 607, 9 N.E.2d 671, syl. 1, 2, 111 A.L.R. 954 (1937), Notes, 11 U. OF
CN. L. REv. 535 (1937), 4 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1937), 111 A.L.R. 954 (1937). A city
charter, granted by public law, will of course be noticed. Grant v. Aldermen, 316 Mass.
432, 55 N.E.2d 705, syl. 4 (1944).
55. They are discarded in the provisions of the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rules
802(a), 803 (1942) (judge may, and if furnished by the party with sufficient information,
must notice private acts, and ordinances and regulations of governmental divisions).
56. See, e.g., Fremoult v. Dedire, 1 P. Wins. 431, 24 Eng. Rep. 458 (Ch. 1718),
Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 174, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (C.P. 1774) ; Collet v. Lord
Keith, 2 East 260, 272, 273, 102 Eng. Rep. 368. (K.B. 1802). This view had wide support
in continental law also. Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J.
1019, n.2 (1941).
57. See, e.g., Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517, 520 (1823).
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laws of another state as foreign for this purpose is less understandable and to
the after-view seems a deplorable instance of mechanical jurisprudence. Yet it
remains today, in nearly every state which has not yet adopted a reformatory
statute, the common law rule that notice will not be given to the laws of
sister states. 5 This is probably the most inconvenient of all the limitations
upon the practice of judicial notice. Notice here could certainly be justified on
the principle of certainty and verifiability, 9 and the burden on the judge
could be minimized by casting the responsibility upon counsel either to
agree upon a stipulation as to the law or to produce on each side for the
benefit of the court all materials necessary for ascertaining the law in question.
Under the present practice when pleading and proof of the foreign law
has been overlooked, or has been unsuccessfully attempted, the resulting
danger of injustice is somewhat mitigated by the presumption that the law
of the sister state is the same as that of the forum, s0 or more simply the
practice of applying local law if the law of the other state is not invoked and
02
proven.0 ' But this presumption-tool is too rough for the job in hand,
58. See, e.g., United Merc. Agencies v. Bissonnette, 155 Fla. 22, 19 So.2d 466, syl.
4, 5, 155 A.L.R. 916 (1944) ; Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10, 59 P.2d 1087, syl. 8
(1936) ; Hillmer v. Grondahl, 109 Vt. 388, 199 Atl. 255, syl. 5 (1938). In New Hampshire,
however, the court found that this rule was so wanting in "logical support" and "practical merits" that the court's continuing responsibility for developing a reasonable
procedure justified it in abandoning the outmoded practice and in taking judicial notice
of the law of sister states. Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N.H. 126, 155 Atl. 47, syl. 11, 14, 15
(1931). If such a common-sense attitude toward the rules of proof were more widespread
the law of evidence would soon be freed from many of its archaic rigidities.
The burden of the requirement of technical proof is somewhat mitigated by statutes
and judicial holdings admitting as evidence printed copies of statutes and decisions
when they profess to be official copies. 5 WIGAORE, EVIDENCE § 1684 (3d ed. 1940).
Or privately printed reports of cases when proved to be commonly used in the courts
of the state where the cases were decided. 6 id. § 1703. Or even legal treatises of
recognized credit. 6 id. § 1697. This practice has been codified in the Uniform Proof of
Statutes Act, now in effect in twenty-three states and territories. 9 U.L.A. 609 (1942)
id. 286 (Supp. 1951).
59. See Section 3 above.
60. Where the question is one which would be governed at the forum by a rule of
common law, it is presumed that the same common law rule prevails in the sister state.
Vartan Garapedian Inc. v. Anderson, 92 N.H. 390, 31 A.2d 371, syl. 1 (1943). But it
has been held that this presumption does not obtain as to the law of Louisiana, which
was not regarded as a common law state. Kennard v. Illinois Central Ry. Co,, 177
Tenn. 311, 148 S.W.2d 1017, syl. 5, 134 A.L.R. 770 (1941). Where the matter is
governed by statute in the forum state, the majority of courts will presume that a
similar statute exists in the sister state. Hall v. Proctor, 242 Ala. 636, 7 So.2d 764, syl.
12 (1942) ; Buhler v. Madison, 105 Utah 39, 140 P.2d 933, syl. 14 (1943). A minority
will in these circumstances presume that the common law of the forum before it was
modified by statute prevails in the sister state. Stern v. Lieberman, 307 Mass. 77, 29

N,E.2d 839, syl. 1 (1940); Zwirn v. Galento, 288 N.Y. 428, 43 N.E.2d 474, syl. 2
(1942). See 9 WIGIMORE, EVIDENCE § 2536 (3d ed. 1940) ;

STJ MBERG,

CONFLICT OF LAWS

176 et seq. (2d ed. 1951); Note, 12 TEXAS L. REv. 333 (1934) ; DEC. Dia.. Evidenee
# 80; 31 C.J.S., Evidence § 133 (1942) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 622, 623

(1934).

61. Bollinger v. Gallegher, 144 Pa. 205, 22 Atl. 815, syl. 3 (1891) ; Blethen v.
Bonner, 93 Tex. 141, 53 S.W. 1016, syl. 1 (1899).
62. See, e.g., Dixie Ohio Exp. Co. v. Butler, 179 Tenn. 358, 166 S.W.2d 614, svl.

1-3 (1942), 17 TENN. L. REv. 877, where the plaintiff sued in Tennessee for a death

injury which occurred in Kentucky. The Kentucky Death Act was neither pleaded nor
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particularly when the materials for ascertaining the laws of sister states are
today almost as readily accessible as those for local law, and in any event
counsel as officers of the court are available to find and present those materials
to the judge in just the same informal and convenient fashion as if they
were arguing a question of local law. In 1936 the Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform Laws accepted this view and drafted the Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act 63 which has now in substance been adopted
by more than half the states. 4 It has been'suggested with much persuasiveness that Congress could and should, under the powers conferred by the Full
Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution prescribe this practice for the
6 5
courts of all the states.
The Law of Foreign Countries.6 6-- Statutes in four of our states6 7 pro-

vide that the court must take judicial notice of the law of foreign countries,
and two states, New York 68 and Michigan, 69 permit the court to do so in its
discretion. Maryland requires its courts to notice the laws of foreign jurisdiction "having a system of law based on the common law of England. ' ' 70 The
Uniform Act, however, contains no provision for notice of the law of other
proved, but a verdict and judgment for damages was rendered for plaintiff. The
Supreme Court, though in previous decisions it had presumed that statutory law in
other states was the same as in Tennessee, declined, "in view of the well known differences beth'een statutes of this kind [Death Acts] in the different states" to presume
the identity of the Kentucky statute with that of the forum, but recognizing that the
failure to plead and prove the Kentucky statute was a mere oversight, it did not
dismiss the suit but remanded it with leave to the plaintiff to amend her declaration. It
called attention, however, to the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, and doubtless as a result of this intimation, the legislature adopted the Act in 1943. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 9773.7-.11 (Williams Supp. 1951).
63. NATIONAL CONF. OF COMM'RS OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1936 HANDBOOK 355-59;
id., 1945 HANDBOOK 124; 9 U.L.A. 271 (1942); id. 176 (Supp. 1951); Notes, 26
CORNELL L.Q. 502 (1941) ; 46 HARV. L. REV. 1019 (1933) ; 32 MASS. L.Q. 20. As to the
requirement of pleading or notice, see Note, 134 A.L.R. 576 (1941). It has been said
that where contrary statutes or decisions of the sister state have not been called to
the court's attention, the presumption of identity will prevail. Strout v. Burgess, 68 A.2d
241, syl. 20, 21, 12 A.L.R.2d 939 (Maine 1949); Knych v. Trustees, 320 Mass. 339,
69 N.E.2d 575, syl. 1 (1946). But cf. Heater v. Mittendorf, 72 Ohio App. 4, 50 N.E.2d
559, syl. 4 (1943) (court required to inform itself of statutes of sister state). In
ascertaining the sister state's law, it is proper for the court to consider an affidavit of an
attorney of that state setting out statutes and passages from court-opinions claimed to
be pertinent. Franzen v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 130 N.J.L. 457, 33 A.2d 599, syl. 7
(1943).
64. See statutes and court rules compiled in 9 WIGIAORE, EVIDENCE § 2573 (3d ed.
1940), and statutes referred to in 9 U.L.A. 170 (Supp. 1951).
65. Hartwig, Congressional Enactment of Uniform Judicial Notice Act, 40 MIcH.
L. REv. 174 (1941). See also Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts, 12. MINN. L. REv.
439 (1928) ; Note, 14 WASH. L. REv. 222 (1939).
66. For valuable discussions, see Nussbaum, The Proble'n of Proving Foreign Law,
50 YALE L.J. 1018 (1941); Keeffe, Landis and Shadd, Sense and Nonsense about
Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REv. 664, 673 (1950); Wachtell, Proof of Foreign Laws
in Anserican Courts, 69 U.S.L. REv. 526, 580 (1935).
67. MAss. ANN. LAws c.233, § 70 (1933); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2168 (1942); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-4 (1943) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5711 (1949).
68. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 344a.
69. MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.874, 27.876 (1938).
70. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 35, § 56 (1939).
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nations. Accordingly in the federal courts and in all the states, except the

seven mentioned above, the common law practice of refusing judicial notice
to the law of foreign countries prevails. 71 Accordingly in these jurisdictions
the burden of strict proof must be undertaken. When the foreign law is in the
form of a statute or decree, it is generally held at least in the earlier cases
in this country that an authenticated copy must be produced. 72 This would

require, in strictness, a sworn or officially certified copy, 73 but (as in respect
to the laws of sister states) 74 this has been ameliorated by statutes or decisions
permitting the use of a copy in a book purporting to be printed by authority
of the foreign state or proved to be commonly recognized in its courts.",
Ordinarily the written text must be interpreted in the light of the applicable
decisions, treatises and commentaries, and this under common-law proof
must be accomplished by taking the testimony in person or by deposition of

an expert in the foreign law.76 The adversary of course is free to take the
testimony of other experts if he can find such on his side, and the crossexamination of conflicting experts is likely to accentuate the disagreement. 77
This method of proof seems to maximize expense and delay and hardly seems
best calculated to ensure a correct decision by our judges on questions of

foreign law. It could be vastly improved by pretrial conferences 78 in which
agreements as to undisputed aspects of the foreign law could be secured, and
by the appointment by the court of one or more experts on foreign law as
referees79 or as court-chosen experts" to report their findings to the court.
71. See, c.g., United States ex rtl. Jelic v. District Director of Immigration, 106
F.2d 14, syl. 11 (2d Cir. 1939) ; Rowan v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 515, syl. 3 (5th Cir.
1941) ; Groome v. Freyn Eng. Co., 374 I1. 113, 28 N.E.2d 274, syl. 4 (1940) ; Greer v.
Paust, 202 Minn. 633, 279 N.W. 568, syl. 2 (1938) ; DEC. DIG., Evidence # 37.
72. See, e.g., Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U.S. 546, 551, 1 Sup. Ct. 418 27 L. Ed. 254
(1882). Cases pro and con are cited in 4 WIG oRE, EVIDENCE § 1271 n.4 3d ed. 1940). In
England an expert was permitted to testify to the effect of the foreign statute, and
indeed the statute's terms were not sufficient to prove the foreign law without the
expert's opinion. Baron de Bode's case, 8 Q.B. 208, 115 Eng. Rep. 854 (1845) ; 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§ 2090a (3d ed. 1940).

73. Emery v. Berry, 28 N.H. 473, 485 (1854) ; see 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1273 (3d
ed. 1940).
74. See note 58 supra.
75. See Uniform Proof of Statutes Act, 9 U.L.A. 609 (1942) ; id. 286 (Supp. 1951);
and statutes and decisions collected in 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1684 (3d ed. 1940); 6
id. § 1703.
76. A case illustrating this practice is Inr re Neilson's Estate, 118 Mont. 304, 165
P.2d 792 (1946) (deposition of legal counselor of Danish Legation discussing legal
treatises and giving opinion as to inheritance rights of aliens under Danish law).
77. "It is the writer's impression that under the present practice of the courts,
skillful advocates may succeed in developing confusing divergencies between experts on
purely verbal matters in situations where coherent and well-substantiated written opinions
would eliminate all difficulties." Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreignr Law, 50
YALE L.J. 1018, 1029 (1941).
78. As provided, for example, by Rule 12, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
79. As to extent of court's common law powers in this direction, see Ex parte
Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 40 Sup. Ct. 253, 64 L. Ed. 919 (1920).
80. See 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 563 (3d ed. 1940) ; Beuscher, Use of Experts by ihe
Courts, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1941) ; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rules 403-10 (1942).
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In any event the adoption by the federal courts and by the states which have
not yet adopted it, of the flexible procedure of judicial notice, whereby the
court is free to get its information from any convenient source, seems the
path of justice and common sense. The courts could then accept, as they
should, the opinions of experts submitted by letters instead of being limited
to cross-examined testimony.
The unwillingness of the courts to notice the laws of other countries
creates difficulties where the party whose case or defense depends, under
conflicts rules, upon foreign law and he fails to prove that law as a fact.
There are several solutions. First, the court may decide the issue against
him for failure of proof.sl This is often a harsh and arbitrary result. Second,
the court may simply apply the law of the forum on the ground that no other
law is before it,8 2 especially if the parties have tried the case as if local law
were applicable.8 3 Third, the court may presume that the law of the other
country is the same as that of the forum,8 4 thus reaching the same result as
under the second theory but raising intellectual difficulties because the
presumption is so frequently contrary to fact. When the doctrine involved is
one of common law, but the other nation is not a common law country, some
courts will decline to apply the presumption.83 On the other hand, when the
common law rule invoked is a part of the common fund of all civilized systems,
such as the binding force of ordinary commercial agreements, the presumption
is applied though the foreign country is not a common law country.86 Moreover, by what is probably the prevailing and more convenient view, if the
See also Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434, 443 (2d Cir. 1949), where in reversing
a lower court decision for the judge's failure to make a finding as to Argentine law,
the court said, "Perhaps [such a finding] can be made without further testimony on the
subject. It may be that, if he considers it desirable, some arrangement will be agreed
upon which will enable the judge to summon an expert of his own choosing."
81. Cf. Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 32 Sup. Ct. 132, 56 L. Ed. 274 (1912).
82. See, e.g., Burgess v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 92 Tex. 125, 46 S.W. 794,
syl. 1 (1899).
83. Watford v. Alabama & Florida Lumber Co., 152 Ala. 178, 44 So. 567, syl. 4
(1907).
84. See, generally, the illuminating discussion in Nussbaum, The Problem of
Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018, 1035 et seq. (1941). See also STUMBERG,
CONFLICT OF LAws 177 (2d ed. 1951). Cases are collected in DEC. DIG., Evidence # 81.
85. Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479, 32 Sup. Ct. 132, 56 L. Ed. 274 (1912)
(law of Cuba as to responsibility of employer for injury to employee) ; Commissioner
v. Hyde, 82 F.2d 174, syl. 9 (2d Cir. 1936) (court cannot presume that French civil law
same as local common law in respect to validity of contract made in France for creation
of trust by husband for wife) ; In re Everett's Estate, 112 Vt. 252, 23 A.2d 202, syl. 6,
7 (1942) (Italy not presumed to have common law rule requiring seal on power of
attorney to execute a bond).
86. Cuba RR. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478, 32 Sup. Ct. 132, 23 L. Ed. 190 (1912)
(dictum) ; Parrot v. Mexican Cent. Railroad Co., 207 Mass. 184, 93 N.E. 590, syl. 7
(1911) (presumption that defendant would be liable in Mexico on agreement made there
by its general passenger agent, under "universally recognized fundamental principles of
right and wrong").
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question would be governed locally by a statute, a like statute in the foreign
87

country may be presumed.

Itternational and Maritime Law.-The rules, principles and traditions
of "international law," or "the law of nations," or the maritime law common
to western nations generally, will be noticed in the federal8s and state courts.1s
Sometimes this is a mere noticing of the international sources of the court's
local law, sometimes it may constitute the noticing of the law regulating
transactions in a foreign country. But as to the latter there are limitations
which narrow the inviting possibilities in the international field of the process
of informal proof and free investigation, which we call judicial notice. If the
maritime rules ° or the prize rules 0l of the foreign country have been published here by governmental authority as the authentic foreign law they will
be noticed. Or if the foreign maritime rules are embodied in a widely-adopted
international convention, they may be considered as having passed into
general maritime law, and noticed as such.02 But even in this last case, it was
held that the court could not notice the subsurface effect and interpretation of
such rules, but would leave this to formal proof.0 3 Specific rules of maritime
law obtaining in the foreign state, not claimed to lie part of the common fund
of international rules will not be noticed.04 Even the presumption of identity
of the foreign law with the local law, which would seem to be unusually
convenient and realistic in the maritime field, has been narrowly restricted 90
87. Wickersham v. Johnston, 104 Cal. 407, 38 Pac. 89, syl. 1 (1894)

(sale of note by

English executors, powers of executors presumed to be limited as under California
statute) ; Murphy v. Murphy, 145 Cal. 482, 78 Pac. 1053, syl. 3 (1904) (California

statutory rate of interest presumed to prevail as to amount due on English judgment).
Contra: Parrot v. Mexican Cent. Railroad Co., 207 Mass. 184, 90 N.E. 590, syl. 5
(1911) (dictum).
88. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 20 Sup. Ct. 290, 299, syl. 6, 44 L. Ed. 320
(1899).
89. McFeena's Adm'r v. Paris Home Telephone Co., 190 Ky. 299, 227 S.W. 450, syl.
3 (1921) (dictum).
90. The New York, 175 U.S. 187, 20 Sup. Ct. 67, 70, 44 L. Ed. 126 (1899); The
Scotia, 14 Wall. 170, 20 L. Ed. 822 (1872) (British orders in council as to the "rules
of the road" at sea, later adopted by Congress).
91. Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1, 38, 2 L. Ed. 15, 27 (1801) (French decree law
as to condemnation of prizes).
92. Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart and Sons, Ltd., 336 U.S. 386, 396,
397, 69 Sup. Ct. 622, syl. 7, 8, 93 L. Ed. 754 (1949).
93. Such holding rests on a supposition that conflicting partisan expert testimony
will reveal more accurately the right foreign interpretation than will the submission
of informal opinions and briefs-a most debatable assumption.
94. Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, Ltd., 336 U.S. 386, 396,
397, 69 Sup. Ct. 622, 628, 93 L. Ed. 754 (1949) ; Yang-Tsze Ins. Ass'n v. Furness Withy
& Co., Ltd., 215 Fed. 859, syl. 4 (2d Cir. 1914); Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d

434, syl. 4 (2d Cir. 1949).
95. See Ozanic v. United States, 165 F.2d 738, syl. 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Sonnescn
v. Panama Transport Co., 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569, syl. 4 (1948).
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5. FACTS RELATING TO THE PERSONNEL, OPERATION AND RECORDS OF THE
COURT96

There is an area of facts relating to the court of which he is the principal
officer that the judge has an official duty to know or to ascertain, and the
judge obviously has special facilities for learning these facts. Moreover,
many of the facts about the court, such as its jurisdiction, are regulated by
domestic law, and many of them if not of general professional knowledge
are readily and certainly verifiable. These bases for judicial notice apply to
the trial judge who is asked to notice facts about his own court, and to the
appellate judges as grounds for noticing facts relating to their own court
and those pertaining to the courts over which they have appellate supervision.
Thus, the judges take notice of the identity of the officers of their courts,
such as the other judges07 the sheriffs, 98 clerks,99 and attorneys; 100 of the
02
duration of the terms and sessions, 10 ' and of the rules of court.' It would
seem obvious that the judge of a court would take notice of all the records
of the institution over which he presides, but the courts have been slow here
to give the principles of judicial notice their full reach of logic and expediency.
It is settled of course that the courts, trial and appellate, take notice of their
own respective records in the present litigation, both as to matters occurring
10 4
The principle
in the immediate trial,10 3 and in previous trials or hearings.
96. See 9 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2578-79; 31 C.J.S., Evidence §§ 44-50 (1942);
DEC. DIG., Evidence # 40-43.
97. Payne v. Williams, 47 Ariz. 396, 56 P.2d 186, syl. 4 (1936) (supreme court
notices names of superior court judges, their counties and terms) ; State ex tel. Nickerson v. Rose, 351 Mo. 1198, 175 S.W.2d 768, syl. 9 (1944) (similar). See also Commonwealth v. Keenan, 347 Pa. 574, 33 A.2d 244, syl. 5, 6 (1943), where, in mandamus
proceeding to compel judges of a common pleas court to decide certain cases long
pending, the supreme court took judicial notice that "illness" pleaded by the president
judge as excuse for his neglect of duty was of such self-inflicted nature as to afford no
excuse for his failure to perform his duties.
98. Sowers-Taylor Co. v. Collins, 14 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. App. 1929) (names of officers
authorized to serve process).
99. Favre v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 180 Miss. 843, 178 So. 327, syl. 2 (1938).
100. Squire v. Bates, 132 Ohio St. 161, 5 N.E.2d 690, syl. 4 (1937) (persons who
have been admitted and dates of their admission).
101. Vance v. Harkey, 186 Ark. 730, 55 S.W.2d 785, syl. 1 (1933) (supreme court
knows that term at which decree entered has elapsed) ; Roberts v. Turk, 225 Ky. 100,
7 S.W.2d 849, syl. 5 (1928) (court of appeals knows its own terms).
102. A trial court, of course, knows its own rules without formal proof. Wallace
v. Martin, 166 So. 874, syl. 1 (La. App. 1936). And on general principles an appellate
court knows judicially what the trial court judicially knew. Nevertheless, many appellate
courts have refused to notice trial court rules, unless embodied in the bill of exceptions.
See, e.g., Scovill v. Cassidy, 275 Ill. 462, 114 N.E. 181, syl. 17 (1916) (where municipal
court rules not in bill of exceptions, appellate court erred in ordering the rules certified
to them and considering them when certified) ; and cases cited 31 C.J.S., Evidence § 49,
n.86 (1942). This inconvenient formalism has been repudiated by statute in Illinois, see
Boettcher v. Howard Engraving Co., 389 I1. 75, 58 N.E.2d 866, syl. 2 (1945), and
elsewhere by decision, see, e.g., Hudson v. Hoster, 47 N.E.2d 637, syl. 3, 4 (Ohio App.
1942).
103. Nichols v. Nichols, 126 Conn. 614, 13 A.2d 591, syl. 8, 12 (1940) (superseded
pleading claimed to constitute admission, will be noticed but must be called to trial
court's attention) ; Branch v. Branch, 194 Ga. 575, 22 S.E.2d 124, syl. 2 (1942).
104. Collins v. Leahy, 347 Mo. 133, 146 S.W.2d 609, syl. 5 (1941) (where city
map was part of record of prior appeal to- supreme court, court would take notice of
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seemingly is equally applicable to matters of record in the proceedings in other
cases in the same court, and some decisions have recognized this, 105 but the
majority thus far have adhered to the needless requirement of formal proof,
rather than informal presentation, of recorded proceedings in other suits in
the same court.1 6 Matters of record in other courts are usually denied notice
but one decision blazes the trail for such notice on the ground that they
are public documents.

10 7

6. OTHER GOVERNMENTAL FACTS

Not only is the judge a judicial officer with the special functions of
knowing or informing himself about the law and about the operations of his
branch of the court-system, but he is an officer as well of the general state
or federal government and has duties and facilities of knowledge about the
powers and operations of such general government. 08 Not only does this
principle serve to justify the practice of noticing governmental facts, but
other principles we have discussed often offer additional bases for judicial
notice in respect to particular governmental facts. Thus, the location of a
state capital is a matter of common knowledge and will usually also be
designated as such in some domestic law, and furthermore, such location
would be a matter verifiable as certain and indisputable. Accordingly, in
considering a question of notice of governmental facts, not only the present
principle but the foregoing alternative possibilities should be canvassed.
International Affairs.-The courts, state and federal, take judicial
notice of treaties entered into by the United States with foreign nations, as
part of the national law3.'° Similarly, as a governmental fact, the courts notice
the recognition by the executive department of a particular foreign governit on subsequent appeal though not introduced in evidence at later trial). But cf. In re
Aughenbaugh, 125 F.2d 887, syl. 1, 2, 5, 6 (3d Cir. 1941) (referee in hearing on contested
claim not entitled to consider, without notice to parties, facts shown by papers previously
filed in the same bankruptcy proceedings).
105. Willson v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 21 Cal.2d 705, 134 P.2d 800, syl. 3 (1943)
(dictum: exceptionally, court will notice proceedings in another case in" interest of
justice); Fox v. Schaeffer, 131 Conn. 439, 41 A.2d 46, syl. 16, 157 A.L.R. 132 (1944)
(right to notice judgment in another case does not mean that court can give weight
to conclusions embodied in judgment) ; Johnson v. Marsh, 146 Neb. 257, 19 N.W.2d
366, syl. 3 (1945) (may notice where other case interwoven with present).
106. Gray v. Bradford, 194 Ga. 492, 22 S.E.2d 43, syl. 10 (1942); People v.
McKinlay, 367 Ill. 504, 11 N.E.2d 933, syl. 6 (1938) ; Naffah v. City Deposit Bank, 339
Pa. 157, 13 A.2d 63, syl. 3 (1940) ; DEc. DIG., Evidence # 43(3).
107. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 48, n.20 (3d Cir. 1947).
108. See, e.g., State v. Sims, 54 S.E.2d 729, 741 (W. Va. 1949).
109. Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653, syl. 9 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Munich Reinsurance
Co. v. First Reinsurance Co., 6 F.2d 742, syl. 4 (2d Cir. 1925); Seaboard Trust
Co. v. Topken, 130 N.J. Eq. 46, 20 A.2d 709, syl. 4 (Ch. 1941); DEc. DIG., Evidence
9
# 39.
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ment. 110 The making of pacts and treaties between foreign governments
would not, seemingly, be noticed under this last theory, but important facts
of international relations, such as the Munich pact of 1938,111 may be
noticed as a matter of common knowledge or as a matter of readily verifiable
current history. Our declaration of war with a foreign power would be
noticed as a governmental fact," 2 as would the making of an armistice or
formal termination of hostilities, but a court has also noticed as a matter of
current history the fact of continued fighting in remote areas after the
Japaneze surrender in September, 1945.113 In like manner, the existence of
4
a state of war between foreign countries may be noticed as a notorious fact."
5
Facts as to the Territory of the Government." 1-Under
the present
principle the state courts take judicial notice of the boundaries of the
nation, 10 of the location of the states and territories,"1 7 and the location and
boundaries of the state in which the court is sitting" s and of the counties,""
districts 12 0 and townships 12 ' thereof, as well as the location of the capital of
the state and the location and identity of the county seats. 12 2 Similarly, the
location and boundary of any incorporated city, as a subdivision of the state
should be noticed. 1 23 The location of governmental buildings124 and institutions 125 is likewise noticed.

110. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309, syl. 1, 62 L. Ed.
726 (1918) (recognition of Carranza government in Mexico first as de facto and later
as de jure government) ; United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330, 57 Sup. Ct. 758,
81 L. Ed. 1134 (1937) (recognition of Soviet government); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 2566, 2574 (3d ed. 1940).
111. United States ex rel. Reichel v. Carusi, 157 F.2d 732, syl. 1 (3d Cir. 1946)
(treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia and its terms) ; Fox River Paper Corp. v.
United States, 65 F. Supp. 605, syl. 4 (E.D. Wis. 1946) (making of Munich treaty in
September 1938 and its effect on world anticipation of peace).
112. See Johnson v. Biddle, 12 F.2d 366, syl. 3 (8th Cir. 1926) ; DEC. DIG., Evidence
# llf. Cf. Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38, syl. 9 (6th Cir. 1949) (noticing existence
of "cold war" necessitating enactment of Selective Service Act of 1948).
113. Miller v. Fowler, 200 Miss. 776, 28 So.2d 837, syl. 3-7 (1947).
114. The Austvard, 34 F. Supp. 431, syl. 9, 10 (D. Md. 1940).
115. 9 WIGmoRm, EVIDENCE § 2575 (3d ed. 1940); DEC. DIG., Evidence # 25; 31
C.J.S., Evidence § 33b (1942).
116. Reese v. Cobb, 135 S.W. 220, syl. 2 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (boundary line
between United States and Mexico, as recognized by their governments).
117. Curtis v. Sexton, 252 Mo. 221, 159 S.W. 512, syl. 11 (1913) (sister states)
Swofford v. State, 3 Tex. App. 76, 84 (1877) (Indian Territory).
118. Watson v. Western Union Co., 178 N.C. 471, 101 S.E. 81, syl. 4 (1919).
119. State v. Armstrong, 315 Mo. 298, 286 S.W. 705, syl. 1 (1926) (location of
city and county of St. Louis) ; Elmore County v. Tallapoosa County, 221 Ala. 182, 128
So. 158, syl. 1 (1930) (area and boundaries).
120. Board of Education v. State, 222 Ala. 70, 131 So. 239, syl. 2 (1930) (school
district).
121. Nelson v. Thomas, 103 Cal. App. 108, 283 Pac. 982, syl. 2 (1930).
122. Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n, 29 Wyo. 461, 215 Pac. 244, syl. 26 (1923).
123. Rosenau v. Lansing, 113 Ore. 638, 234 Pac. 270, syl. 2 (1925).
124. Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.2d 309, 44 P.2d 547, syl. 7 (1935).
125. Murphy v. Daly, 206 Ind. 179, 188 N.E. 769, syl. 6 (1934) (state prison).
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Identity of Officials and Other Facts about Them.12--Al1 courts would
presumably notice the identity of the principal officers of the national government. 127 Courts, whether state or federal, sitting in a state would notice the
identity of incumbents of principal state offices. 12 Similarly trial courts are
entitled to notice the incumbency of particular persons as officers of the
county or district in which the court is sitting.'" Similarly, the dates of the
beginning and end of their periods of service'30 and the amount of their
salaries 131 will be noticed as to officers of these classes. But as to officers
not within these descriptions, and generally as to officers in inconspicuous
or subordinate posts the courts, though judicial knowledge could often be
justified on grounds of verifiability, are inclined to refuse to notice their
identity. 3 '
Official Doctnents.-Within limits similar to those prescribed in the
preceding paragraph, the courts have judicially noticed the existence and
contents of documents issued by the classes of officers indicated above as their
public, written acts. 3 3 This doctrine dispenses with formal authenticating
proof of the genuineness of the documents, but this does not mean that if the
126. See 9 WIGI,,oRE, EVIDENCE § 2576 (3d ed. 1940); DEC. DIG., Evidence # 44;
31 C.J.S., Evidence § 37 (1942).
127. United States v. Phelps, 40 F.2d 500, syl. 1 (2d Cir. 1930) (assistants to
the Secretary of Labor) ; Lyman Flood Prevention Ass'n v. Topeka, 152 Kan. 484, 106
P.2d 117, syl. 1 (1940) (time of retirement of Woodring as Secretary of War)'; In re
Son-se-grah's Will, 78 Okla. 213, 189 Pac. 865, syl. 3 (1920) ("heads of departments of the federal government and their chief subordinates").
128. See, e.g., Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 F.2d 240, syl. 3 (3d Cir. 1945)
(that named defendants were officials of Pennsylvania and New York); Patten v.
Miller, 190 Ga. 123, 8 S.E.2d 757, syl. 2 (1940) (chairman, State Highway Board).
129. See, e.g., Prudential Insurance Co. v. Calvin, 227 Ala. 146, 148 So. 837, syl. 4
(1933) (that certain person was health officer and death certificate issued by him as
registrar) ; Rockford v. Mower, 259 II1. 604, 102 N.E. 1032, syl. 4 (1913) (persons
holding office as city clerk in the various cities in the county in which court is sitting).
130. People v. Neary, 113 Colo. 12, 154 P.2d 48, syl. 1 (1945) (end of term of
state district attorney); Lyman Flood Prevention Ass'n v. Topeka, 152 Kan. 484, 106
P.2d 117, syl. 1 (1940) (time of retirement of Secretary of War).
131. Pink v. State, 105 S.W.2d 265, syl. 4 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), aff'd, 133 Tex.
82, 124 S.W.2d 981 (1939) (in passing upon receiver's fee court could notice salaries
of state offices held by him).
132. See, e.g., Crawford v. State, 155 Ind. 692, 57 N.E. 931, syl. 2 (1900) (deputy
attorney general) ; Ward v. Henry, 19 Wis. 76, 81 (1865) (deputy marshal). A classic
instance of illiberality in denying notice is People v. Schmitz, 153 Cal. xviii, 94 Pac.
419, syl. 5 (1908) (indictment for extortion defective in failing- to allege that defendants
Schmidt and Ruef were mayor and political boss of San Francisco though both of those
facts were notorious), criticised in 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2583 (3d ed. 1940).
133. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Jones, 105 F.2d 58, syl. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (records
and reports of Home Owners' Loan Corporation) ; General Hosp. Soc. v. New Haven
County, 127 Conn. 53, 14 A.2d 746, syl. 3 (1940) (returns of county commissioners
as printed by comptroller) ; State v. Couch, 139 Fla. 353, 190 So. 723, syl. 2 (1939) (bill
filed in office of secretary of state) ; Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366,
44 N.E.2d 687, syl. 5 (1942) (President's reports to Congress under Lease-Lend Act) ;
and cases cited DEC. DIG., Evidence # 48. But the practice is limited to public transactions
of general interest. Carson Cadillac Corp. v. Birmingham, 232 Ala. 512, 167 So. 794,
syl. 3 (1936); 20 Am. JuL., Evidence § 44 (1939). All public transactions which are
embodied in the Federal Register, "shall be judicially noticed." The Federal Register
Act, 44 U.S.C.A. § 307 (Supp. 1951).
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document is a statement of facts, such facts are themselves judicially
noticed. 134 A similar result of dispensing with formal authentication may be
attained by doctrines to the effect that signatures of such officers may be
"noticed" as genuine, or that their seals will be "noticed."' 3 5 Wigmore has
suggested that a more supportable theory is that the purported signatures
and seals are themselves accepted as sufficient evidence of the genuineness
86
of the document.1
7. SOCIAL AND ECONOmIc DATA USED IN JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING:
"LEGISLATIVE"

FACTS'

37

Under modern views, the judge has not only the task of finding what
the law is, but between the gaps of existing doctrines to create new law.13
In doing this, he will be guided as a legislator would be' 39 by considerations
of expediency and public policy. In doing so he must act either upon knowledge
already possessed or upon assumptions, or upon investigation of the pertinent
general facts, social, economic, political, or scientific. Under the older tradition
the custom was to rationalize the result solely in terms of analogy to old
doctrines leaving the considerations of expediency unstated. In recent
decades the trend is toward a wider use by the judges in their opinions of
explicit statements of their policy-judgments and of the factual grounds therefor. These latter have been helpfully classed as "legislative facts," as contrasted with "adjudicative facts" which are the facts about the particular
parties to the controversy and their specific interests and transactions. 40
How are these legislative facts to be presented to the court?
134. See the illuminating opinion of Magruder, J., in Stasiukevich v. Nichols, 168
F.2d 474, 479, syl. 7-12 (lst Cir. 1948). And United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 19411945, 59 HARv. L. REv. 481, 485-86 (1946).
135. See, e.g., Atlantic Industrial Bank v. Centonze, 130 Conn. 18, 31 A.2d 392, syl. 1
(1943) (seals and signatures of heads of department of state government) ; Kuhnhausen
v. Stadelman, 174 Ore. 290, 148 P.2d 239, 149 P.2d 239 (1944) .(statute requiring notice
of succession in office and signatures and seals of "principal" officers not limited to most
exalted) ; DEc. DIG., Evidence # 49, 31 C.J.S., Evidence § 38 (1942).
136. 7 WIGmoaE, EVIDENCE § 2161 (3d ed. 1940). For the scope and limits of the
rule as applied to official documents, see 7 id. §§ 2161-67.
137. See Davis, Official Notice, 62 HARv. L. REV. 537, esp. 549-60 (1949) (unusually
original and enlightening discussion) ; Davis, Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARv. L. REv. 364, 404 (1942); Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARv. L. REV. 269,
287-91; Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HAv.L. REV. 1303, 1318-25 (1942); 1 WIGmoRE,
EVIDENCE § 41 (3d ed. 1940) ; 9 id. § 2555(d) ; Bikle, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting Constitutional Validity, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1924) ; cf. Fuchs
and Freedman, Wagner Act Decisions and Factual Technique in Public Law Cases, 22
WASH. U.L.Q. 510 (1937); Manoff and Sarcia, Pleading and Proof of Constitutional
Facts, 15 CONN. B.J. 227 (1941). See also Notes, The Consideration of Facts in Due
Process Cases, 30 CoL. L. REv. 360 (1930), Social and Economic Facts-Appraisal of
Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them to the Courts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1948),
The Presentationof Facts Underlying the Constitutionality of Statutes, 49 HARv. L. REV.
631 (1936), Consideration of Facts in Due Process Cases, 23 IND. L.J. 176 (1948), Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence on Constitutionality of Statutes, 82 L. Ed. 1244 (1938).
138. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113, 114 (1921).
139. Id. at 120.
140. Davis, Official Notice, 62 HARv. L. REV. 537, 549 et seq. (1949).
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"Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is
attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice, such facts may
properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry, Borden's Farm Products Co. v.
Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, and the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the
existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court
that those facts have ceased to exist. Chastleton Corporationv. Sinclair,264 U.S. 543......
The usual resort, however, for ascertainment of legislative facts is not
through formal proof by sworn witnesses and authenticated documents but by
the process of judicial notice. Is judicial notice here trammeled by the usual
requirement that the facts noticed must be certain and indisputable? Such a
requirement seems inappropriate here where the facts are often generalized
and statistical and where their use is more nearly argumentative, or as a help
to value-judgments, than conclusive or demonstrative.
In cases where the validity of a statute is attacked for want of due process
the nature of the issue narrows sharply the need for certainty. The court
is asking not whether the social facts support the statute, but only whether
the legislature had reasonable grounds for believing that they do.' 42 On this
14
issue, the court considers such data as reports of legislative committees,
investigating commissions, 144 and administrative bureaus, 14 compilations of

legislation in the various states and countries,

14

encyclopedias, 4 7 dic-

141. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153, 58 Sup. Ct. 778, 82
L. Ed. 1234 (1938). And this practice obtains in a majority of state courts. Ritholz v.
Johnson, 244 Wis. 494, 12 N.W.2d 738, syl. 7 (1944) ; Note, 82 L. Ed. 1246. A minority
hold that the court is limited in its consideration of "legislative" facts to those of which
it can take judicial notice. Note, 82 L. Ed. 1244, 1250 (1938). Upon such "judicial
inquiry" by formal proof,, the decision since it concerns the ascertaining of law is for
the judge, not the jury. 9 WIGmORE, EvIDENCE § 2555(d) (3d ed. 1940).
142. Thus in repelling an attack on the Filled Milk Act as wanting in due process,
the court said, "When Congress exercises a delegated power such as that over interstate commerce, the methods which it employs to carry out its purposes are beyond
attack without a clear and convincing showing that there is no rational basis for the
legislation; that it is an arbitrary fiat." Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323
U.S. 18, 31, 65 Sup. Ct. 1, 89 L. E. 15 (1944).
143. Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 28, 65 Sup. Ct. 1, 89 L. Ed.
15 (1944); Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 561, 44 Sup. Ct. 628, 68 L. Ed.
1174 (1924).
144. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 245, 42 Sup. Ct. 289, 66 L. Ed. 595
(1922) (reports of governor's and mayor's committees on housing emergency) ; McLean
v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 549, 29 Sup. Ct. 206, 53 L. Ed. 315 (report of industrial
commission authorized by Congress to show need for state miners' wage regulation).
145. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 363, 63 Sup. Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed. 315 (1942)
(reports of U. S. Tariff Commission and publications of U. S. Department of Agriculture, notice as supporting economic need for raising proration program under state act).
146. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242 U.S. 153, 157, 158, 37 Sup. Ct. 28,
61 L. Ed. 217 (1916) (butterfat requirements for ice-cream) ; Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412, 419, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. 551 (1908) (compilation in the famous
"Brandeis brief" of laws regulating working hours of women) ; State v. Main, 69 Conn.
123, 135, 37 Atl. 80 (1897) ("peach yellows").
147. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643
(1905) (showing experience of other countries with compulsory vaccination).
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tionaries,' 4s and scientific books and articles. 149 In this context, when the
courts state that they take judicial notice of such writings, they mean merely
that they take notice that such sources are authentic and sufficiently reliable
for the legislature reasonably to give weight to their statements' 5° -not that
they take notice of the truth of the statements.' 5 ' A similarly restrictive use
may be made when such fact-reports are noticed for the purpose of aiding
in the interpretation of a statute. Committee reports and other sources
reciting social facts may often be used not to show what the facts were, but
what was reported to the legislature, 5 2 or what was so widely or authorita153
tively believed that it was probably considered by them.
Situations remain, however, where these discriminations are inapplicable
and where the judge as law-maker must search for the social facts as they
are in truth, and not merely for what the legislature could reasonably have
supposed them to be. Shall the court in a state where the question is new,
accept or reject, in the light of the social and economic consequences, the
traditional doctrine that in letting a dwelling-place the landlord has no duty
to repair defects that are dangerous to the life of the occupant? 154 In fixing
common law liability for injury to a pedestrian shall an automobile be classed
as a "dangerous machine" ?155 At a time when the tests were relatively new
should the court admit evidence of the results of a blood-test for paternity?
148. State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 135, 37 Atl. 80 (1897) ("peach yellows").
149. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 33, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643
(1905) (text on vaccination) ; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 363-68, 63 Sup. Ct. 307,
87 L. Ed. 315 (1943) (reports, bulletins, articles and books on the economics of the
grape industry).
150. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. 551 (1908)
("The legislation and opinions referred to in the margin may not be, technically speaking,
authorities, and in them is little or no discussion of the constitutional question presented
to us for determination, yet they are significant of a widespread belief that woman's
physical structure, and the functions she performs in consequence thereof, justify special
legislation restricting or qualifying the conditions under which she should be permitted
to toil") ; Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 31, 65 Sup. Ct. 1,
89 L. Ed. 15 (1944).
151. See Stasiukevich v. Nichols, 168 F.2d 474, 479 (1st Cir. 1948).
152. And hence the probable purpose and scope of the statute. See Note, Legislative
Materials to Aid Statutory Interpretation,50 HARV. L. REv. 822, 826 (1937).
153. See H. J. Heinz Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 514, 523-26, 61 Sup. Ct. 320, 85
L. Ed. 309 (1941), where the court in determining whether refusal to sign a written
agreement was an unfair labor practice under the Act, referred to materials outside
the record including textbooks on the history of labor-relations, articles, official and
unofficial bulletins and other materials.
154. See Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1318 (1942).
155. See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 16 A.L.R.
255 (1920), where the court, on the basis of statistics of deaths and injuries due to
automobiles taken from Census Bureau reports and of opinions expressed in publications of the National Safety Council concludes that they are "dangerous machines."
See also Davis v. Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 316, 43 Sup. Ct. 556, 67 L. Ed.
996 (1923), where the court struck down as a "burden on interstate commerce" a
Minnesota statute permitting a summons to foreign railroad corporations to be served
on a soliciting agent in the state; in reaching that conclusion it relied on statistics as to
the numbers of suits against such railroads in Minnesota

proclamation of the governor.

courts, as recited in a
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The courts today are coming more and more to bring into the open such
policy questions as the basis for making law by a choice of doctrines. On
some such questions, particularly those of scientific cast as in the paternitytest example, the court might be willing to hear formal expert testimony,
but its normal reliance is judicial notice. Under this process the social,
economic and scientific data can be conveniently and cheaply presented in
the briefs, or can be found by the research of the judge or his assistants.
And here again, it is believed, the usual requirements for judicial notice of
certainty and indisputability should not be insisted on. The reports, statistics
and professional opinions which the judge relies on will be those which he
thinks most trustworthy, but they will not usually be indisputable. 1 60 Nor
should the ultimate fact-conclusions of the judge on which his policy-judgment is based be required to be certain. In the realm of basic "legislative"
facts, as in respect to policy-valuations themselves, certainly "is not the
destiny of man."
Judicial notice in the field of "legislative" facts is an important avenue
for a more informed consideration by our courts in policy-making of the
contributions of the social, economic and physical sciences. No rigid requirement of certainty should curb it, but appropriate safeguards should be
developed. Among these are the giving of notice to the parties (perhaps in
some cases accompanied with proposed findings),157 affording them opportunity
to furnish materials, or supplementary materials, when such notification is
needed, 158 and in exceptional cases the resort to expert referees or masters to
ascertain the facts.'5 9
S. PROCEDURAL INCIDENTS

Some of the practical requirements and effects of judicial notice should
be briefly discussed.
First, the distinction should again be mentioned between taking judicial
notice of sources, documents and materials, 00 without formal proof of
156. See Davis, Official Notice, 61 HARv. L. REv. 537, 549-56 (1949) ; Davis,
Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 403-07 (1942).
157. This suggestion is made in Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 692, 698 (1948). Cf. the
"proposed report" of administrative agencies as described in Davis, Olicial Notice,
62 HARV. L. REV. 537, 559-63 (1949).
158. Note, 61 HARV. L. REV. 692, 697 (1948).
159. For discussion of these and similar aids to the court see Note, 61 HARv. L.
REv. 692, 700 (1948) ; Beuscher, The Use of Experts by the Courts, 54 HARv. L. REV.
1105, 1107, 1118 (1941) (quoting from the English Rules of the Supreme Court).
160. Examples: People v. Stralla, 14 Cal.2d 617, 96 P.2d 941, syl. 1 (1939) (for
determining whether gambling ship was operated in a "bay," may examine historical
data and maps); Schultz v. Winston & Newell Co., 68 N.D. 674, 283 N.W. 69, syl. 5
(1938) (mortality tables) ; McClain v. Comm., 189 Va. 847, 55 S.E.2d 49, syl. 4 (1949)
(official map).
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authenticity, and taking notice of facts recited in such materials. 161 The
court in noticing the materials may intend to notice the facts also, but the
court's statement that it takes notice of the particular source must be shown
to have had the wider intent before it can be persuasively cited as a precedent
for that effect.
Fairness will ordinarily require that the court before making a final
ruling that .judicial notice will be taken of a given fact should notify the
parties of his intention to do so and afford them an opportunity to present
information which might bear upon the propriety of noticing the fact, or
162
upon the truth of the matter to be noticed.
In some instances it will be apparent to the court that the matter is
one which the parties are expecting him to notice. The tenor of domestic law,
common and statutory, and facts of universal knowledge are examples. 163
In a wide range of other matters, however, such expectation would not be
obvious. 16 4 As to facts of this kind, and as to materials, records and sources
of information sought to be noticed the party seeking notice must ordinarily
request such notice and present such materials at the trial, if he is to complain
later of the court's failure to notice such facts or materials. 165
Assuming that the requirement of a request is satisfied or that a case
is presented where request is unnecessary, is the court bound to take
161. The distinction is taken in Stasiukevich v. Nichols, 168 F.2d 474, 479, syl. 9

(1st Cir. 1948); and

in Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REv.
481, 485-86 (1946). See also Fox v. Schaeffer, 131 Conn. 439, 41 A.2d 46, syl. 16, 157
A.L.R. 132 (1944) (right of the court to notice a judgment appearing in a file in
another case in same court does not mean that it will give it conclusive effect as to
facts found).
162. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 804(1) (1942) so provides. The ruling in It re
Aughenbaugh, 125 F.2d 887 (3d Cir. 1942), see note 105, supra, seems explainable
on this principle. See also UNIFORiu JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOPEIGN LA.w Acr § 4.
163. As to these, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 801 (1942) provides that the
judge "shall of his own motion take judicial notice." See Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp.,
155 F.2d 808, syl. 6 (10th Cir. 1946), 60 HARV. L. REV. 299, where the trial court, though
not requested to do, was reversed for failure to take notice, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that the street-car involved in the accident was equipped with a warning bell.
See also Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 317 U.S. 481, 488, 63 Sup. Ct. 347, syl. 10,
87 L. Ed. 411 (1943) (appellate court reversed for failure to notice a rule of the ICC
having the force of law, though the rule was not called to the attention of the trial
court whose holding was consistent'with it).
164. See Ellison, P.J., in Christy v. Wabash Ry. Co., 195 Mo. App. 232, 191 S.W.
241, 245 (1917).
165. Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 261, 264, 81 L. Ed. 355, 113 A.L.R.
253 (1937) (particular Mexican Constitutional provisions, laws, etc.); Goodlhall v.
Cox, 129 Conn. 79, 26 A.2d 551, syl. 3 (1942) (public documents) ; Knych v. Trustees,
320 Mass. 339, 69 N.E.2d 575, syl. 1 (1946) (laws of New York); Line v. Line, 119
Md. 403, 86 Atl. 1032, syl. 5 (1913) (that certain date fell on Sunday); Christy v.
Wabash Ry. Co., 195 Mo. App. 232, 191 S.W. 241, syl. 14 (1917) (ICC rule, but cf.
Lilly case, supra note 163) ; Russell v. Kniffin, 118 Misc. 808, 194 N.Y. Supp. 792, syl. 2
(Sup. Ct. 1922) (that date was Sunday); Amundson v. Wilson, 11 N.D. 193, 91 N.W.
37, syl. 4 (1902) (previous judgment) ; Mogul Transportation Co. v. Larison, 181 Ore.
252, 181 P.2d 139, syl. 3 (1947) (OPA regulations); 9 WIGAIORE, EVIDENCE § 2568
(3d ed. 1940) ; Note, 113 A.L.R. 258, 259 (1938) ; 31 C.J.S., Evidence § 13c (1942). See
extensive Note, Judicial Notice by Appellate Courts of Facts and Foreign Laws not
Brought to the Attention of the Trial Court, 42 MICH. L. REv. 509 (1943).
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judicial notice wherever the fact is proper for it? It seems to be agreed that
in some cases it is mandatory, as for example in respect to domestic law
and facts universally known. 166 In another range of cases it is discretionary
whether the court will take judicial notice or will leave the matter to formal
proof.6 7 It has been said with much generality that the exercise of discretion
"depends on the nature of the subject, the issue involved, and the apparent
justice of the case."' 6 5
If the trial judge takes judicial notice of a fact, how far is this fact
thereafter open to dispute? Certain situations should be distinguished. First,
it is clear that fairness often requires that the judge before he notices a fact
apprise the parties of the possibility and give them an opportunity to bring
forward, not formal proof, but informal data (books of authority, calendars.
scientific articles, government bulletins, etc.) to convince him that the
matter is not clear and hence not proper for notice, or that the fact he proposes to find is not true.16 9 That is part of the investigative process which
is judicial notice. Second, as we have seen, the courts often take judicial notice
of the authenticity and general trustwoythiness of particular sources of information, such as legislative committee reports, or government bulletins,
but not of the facts asserted therein. 170 When this is so, even though the
authenticity of the source may not be attacked by formal proof, the facts as166. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 801 (1942); Power v. Bowdle, 3 N.D. 107, 54
N.W. 404, syl. 6 (1893) (trial court reversed for failure to notice that under general
usage of state, abbreviated symbols on tax rolls were insufficient descriptions of the
land taxed). See 20 Amx. JuR., Evidence § 23 (1939).
167. THAYER, PRELmII:NARY TREATISE Ox EVIDENcE 309 (1898) ("Courts may
judicially notice much which they cannot be required to notice") ; Burkuhl v. F. T.
O'Dell Const. Co., 232 Mo. App. 967, 95 S.W.2d 843, syl. 6 (1936) (that barn higher
than other buildings more likely to be struck by lightning, discretionary, notice taken) ;
Walsh v. Public Service Co., 92 N.H. 331, 30 A.2d 494, syl. 3-5 (1943) (municipal
ordinance, discretionary, notice not taken, but party did not tender "proof" of its
terms) ; Kraus v. Kraus, 183 Misc. 667, 51 N.Y.S.2d 886, syl. I (Sup. Ct. 1944)
,notice of foreign law, discretionary, under statute) ; Randall v. Commonwealth, 183
Va. 182, 31 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1944) (trial court properly in its discretion noticed
that certain well known house was in the county). Of course, the wording of particular
statutes regulating judicial notice in terms of "may" or "shall" will often control. See.
e.g., Kraus v. Kraus, supra. The Model Code of Evidence provides for compulsory notice
without request-domestic common law and public statutes and indisputable "propositions
of generalized knowledge" (Rule 801) ; discretionary notice without request-private
acts, ordinances and regulations, specific notorious facts, specific and generalized facts
capable of certain verification, law of sister states (Rule 802); and compulsory notice
on request-matters mentioned in Rule 802 must be noticed if the party requests notice
and furnishes adequate information, and has notified the adversary (Rule 803).
168. Hunter v. New York, 0. & W. Ry. Co., 116 N.Y. 615, 23 N.E. 9, 10 (1889).
169. See, e.g., Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'r, 301 U.S. 292,
300-3, 57 Sup. Ct. 724, syl. 4-6, 81 L. Ed. 1093 (1937) (where commission, after ratehearing, considered additional sources of information without notifying the utility nor
embodying the sources in the record, and state reviewing court considered only the
record and took "the word of the Commission as to the outcome of a secret investigation," due process denied). MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 804(1) (1942) provides:
"The judge shall inform the parties of the tenor of any matter to be judicially noticed by
him and afford each of them reasonable opportunity to present to him information relevant
to the propriety of taking such judicial notice or to the tenor of the matter to be noticed."
170. See note 161 supra.
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serted can be freely disputed by evidence.' 7 1 Again, the court may take judicial
notice of a fact, not as constituting part of the issue, but merely as circumstantial evidence, raising an inference of some other ultimate fact in issue.
At the same time the court may rule that the fact noticed does of itself give
rise to a permissible inference, or an ad hoc presumption, of the ultimate fact.
In such event, even though the fact noticed -could not be contradicted by
172
evidence, of course evidence would be allowable to rebut the inference.
This brings us to the crucial question, if the judge after due investigation with opportunity for thie-parties to assist therein, makes his deliberate
ruling that he takes judicial notice of a given material fact, may the opposing
party dispute by formal evidence the truth of the fact noticed, and in a
jury-tried case, ask that the question of fact be submitted to them? Thayer
suggests qualifiedly' an affirmative answer'7 and Wigmore more sweepingly
follows in his train.174 However, it seems that even these great writers .and
judges equally great,173 in advocating this view lose sight of the reasons for
judicial notice and its purpose and function. As we have seen the conditions
of judicial notice are that the fact to be noticed must either be (a) in the
special competence of the judge, such as a conclusion about the content of
a legal rule or of "legislative" fact, or (b) indisputable, because it is universally
known to be true or because it can be readily and certainly verified upon
reference to unimpeachable sources. As to the first it is apparent that the
judge is specially equipped to go to reliable sources, that testimony would be
a waste of time, and that the jury has no function to play. As to the second,
the obvious policy is that parties shall not be permitted to dispute by proof
what the judge has found to be a moot or sham issue, not susceptible of
reasonable dispute. Thus judicial notice of indisputable facts rests on the
same policy as the practice of summary judgments. Accordingly the weight
171. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 446, syl. 42 (2d Cir.
1945), explained in Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REv. 480,
482-86 (1946).
172. In Harper Furniture Co. v. Southern Express Co., 144 N.C. 639, 57 S.E. 458,
459, syl. 1 (1907), an action for delay in dispatching a broken crank shaft from Erie,
Pa., to plaintiff at Lenoir, N.C., the court held that it would take judicial notice of the
existence of railroad lines between the two cities and of the nature of the express
business and said, "The court taking judicial notice of these facts, it must follow,
as a fair and reasonable inference, that 14 days is too long a time for the transportation
of freight by express between the two points, Lenoir, N.C., and Erie, Pa., and that,
prima facie, there has been actionable negligence in the performance of the contract of
carriage."
173. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENcE 308-09, 1 (3) (1898).
174. 9 WIGNORE, EVIDENcE § 2567 (3d ed. 1940).
175. See the expressions of Cardozo, J., and Learned Hand, J., respectively, in Ohio
Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'r, 301 U.S. 292, 300-03, 57 Sup. Ct. 724, syl. 4-6,
81 L. Ed. 1093 (1937); and United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,
446, syl. 42 (2d Cir. 1945).
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of reason 7M and the prevailing authority 177 support the view that a ruling
that a fact will be judicially noticed precludes contradictory evidence and
requires that the judge instruct the jury that they must accept the fact as true.
The action of the trial judge taking notice of a fact or directing the
jury to find it, or refusing to take judicial notice, should be embodied in the
record for appellate review, with references to its sources when appropriate.""8
If the fact was one proper for judicial notice by the trial court, as for example
a matter notorious in the local community, the upper court will likewise
notice it,' 79 and similarly if not within the power of the lower court, the
upper court will hold itself within the same limit.' 80 As we have seen above,
the failure of the party to request judicial notice of a fact at the trial is
significant in: determining the fairness of his complaint on appeal of the
judge's failure to notice. In the absence of such request below will the upper
176. Most convincingly expounded in Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV.
269, esp. 273-87 (1944), and by the same author in The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945,
59 HARv. L. Rsv. 481, 482-87 (1946).
177. See, e.g., Lane v. Sargent, 217 Fed. 237 syl. 1 (1st Cir. 1914) (federal court
in New Hampshire will notice Massachusetts lav and properly excluded evidence of
Massachusetts decisions); State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 37 At. 80, syl. 3 (1897) (in
passing on validity of statute providing for destruction of infected trees court should
take judicial notice of prevalence of belief in danger of "peach yellows" and not submit
reasonableness of the law to jury) : Beardsley v. Irving, 81 Conn. 489, 71 Atl. 580, syl. 2
(1909) (party entitled to have the court take notice whether date fellon Sunday and instruct
jury accordingly rather than leave question to them) ; State ex rel. Landis v. Thompson,
121 Fla. 561, 164 So. 192, syl. 6 (1935) (judicial notice of legislative journals precludes
contradictory evidence); Nicketta v. National Tea Co., 338 Ill. App. 159, 87 N.E.2d
30, syl. 1 (1949) (trial court properly took notice on pleadings that trichinosis cannot
be contracted from eating properly cooked pork, and dismissed complaint; evidence thereon
unnecessary); Commonwealth v. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68, 21 N.E. 228, syl. 2 (1889)
(court will take notice that tobacco and cigars are not medicine and exclude testimony to
contrary); Stocker v. Boston & M.R. Co., 83 N.H. 401, 143 Atl. 68, syl. 11 (1928)
(railroad's, knowledge of protective devices at crossings judicially noticed; evidence
thereof unnecessary and fact cannot be contracted). See CAL. CoDE CIV. PRoc. ANN.
§ 2102 (1949) § 2102 ("the court is to declare such knowledge to jury who are bound to
accept it") and other western codes cited 9 WIG-toRE, EviDENCE § 2567, n.4 (3d ed.
1940) ; MODEL CODE oF EVIDENCE, Rule 805(b) (1942) ("the judge . . . shall direct the

trier to find the fact as so noticed").
Contra: In re Bowling Green Milling Co., 132 F.2d 279, syl. 10 (6th Cir. 1942)
(dictum) ; Macht v. Hecht Co., 191 Md. 98, 59 A.2d 754, syl. 5 (1948) (refusal to take
judicial notice on pleadings of a fact open to dispute; dictum that if notice taken, can
dispute by evidence) ; Scheufler v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 886, 169 S.W.2d
359, syl. 13 (1943) (in application for allowance of fee, judicial notice of prior proceedings does not cut off applicant's right to be heard on reasonableness of allowance) ;
State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Norcross, 132 Wis. 534, 112 N.W. 40, syl. 1 (1907) (in
proceeding to abate dam as nuisance court could not, on demurrer to complaint, take
notice that stream was not navigable and thereby cut off contrary evidence) ; and see
cases cited in notes 169 and 171 supra.
Cases pro and con are cited in Wickes, Book Review, 16 TEXAS L. REv. 204, 207,
208 (1938), and 31 C.J.S., Evidence § 13, nn.61, 62 (1942).
178. See Nichols v. Nichols, 126 Conn. 614, 13 A.2d 591, syl. 13 (1940); MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 805 (1942).

179. Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 343, 181 Pac. 223, syl. 7 (1919).
180. Thus the Supreme Court of the United States in reviewing lower federal courts
takes judicial notice as the lower courts may of the laws of all the states, but in reviewing state courts it takes notice of other states' laws, only when the particular state
court under review has that power. Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1, 6, 6 Sup. Ct. 242,
245, 29 L. Ed. 535 (1885).
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court notice the matter? If the effect will be to sustain a satisfactory judgment, the court is much more likely to do so, than when the result is reversal
of a judgment apparently just.' s ' The matter is probably not reducible to,
rule.'8 2 The trial court's findings in the realm of judicial notice are not
conclusive upon the upper court, which may make its own investigation and
53
reach its finding indepenctently.3

9. TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
All writers on the subject have been impressed by the importance and
the latent possibilities for usefulness of the process of judicial notice.
What trends in its past growth can we discern which may be projected into
the future? In the first place, the emphasis is shifting from the ancient and
now comparatively less important basis of "common knowledge" to the more
pregnant basis of verifiable certainty. This latter is a channel which easily
brings to the court the abundant fruits of new scientific findings and discoveries as soon as they become professionally accepted and enables the court
to translate these findings to the jury not tentatively but with authority. In
the second place, this shift of emphasis, from what needs no proof to what
can be verified with certainty by investigation, reveals that judicial notice is
not merely a substitute for formal proof by witnesses but is itself another
method of proof of certain kinds of facts, namely, the method of research
into the professionally authoritative books and reports in the particular field.
Viewed thus as a new system of proof of facts within a particular range it
is apparent that judicial notice is still in a formative stage. To attain full
usefulness, certain directions of growth may be looked for. Among these are
the clearer acceptance of safeguards for the parties in the form of notice and
opportunity to present materials on matters proposed to be noticed, the wider
consciousness of the responsibility of counsel for the production of reliable
sources for investigation, the realization by the judges of their primary responsibility for the adequacy of the research and the trustworthiness of the
sources relied on, and finally the provision for the judges of expert and
impartial assistants who can evaluate the data from the viewpoint of the
particular science in cases when such evaluation is beyond the competence of
the judges.
181. See Note, 42 MIcH. L. REv. 509, 513, (1943).

182. See discussion of Clark, J., in American Legion Post v. First Nat. Bank, 113
F.2d 868, 872, syl. 4, 5 (2d Cir. 1940).
183. 9 WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 2567(c) (3d ed. 1940). And the failure or refusal of
the trial court to take notice of a fact does not preclude the upper court from noticing
it. Rogers v. Cody; 8 Cal. 324, 38 Pac. 81, syl. 1 (1894) (that land foreclosed was
outside county).

